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CATASTROPHIC RISK AND GOVERNANCE
AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA: A Postscript to
Terrorism Risk in a Post-9111 Economy
Robert J. Rheet
In an earlier article, published with this fine journal, I analyzed terrorism
risk and its economic consequences with the caveat that the "greatest risk of
exogenous shock to the industry is from a natural mega-catastrophe."' Since
the article addressed terrorism risk, this idea was expressed only in passing.
During and since publication, a number of stunning catastrophes have
occurred in various corners of the world, including the South Asia tsunami,
human-to-human transmission of the H5N1 avian flu virus, and Hurricane
Katrina.2 In this essay, I expand my original idea and inquire into the
political economy and system of governance that have made catastrophes
more frequent and severe.
The nature of catastrophe, whether manmade or natural, has changed and
so too must our perception and response. Like manmade catastrophes,
natural disasters are not merely acts of God; rather, mortal activity can
influence their causality or consequence. Individual choices and
government action can amplify natural catastrophic risk. This is seen in
government risk-mitigation efforts such as flood insurance and response to
catastrophes, including the recent failures in New Orleans. The system of
governance that is designed to mitigate risk and respond to catastrophes can
be ineffective, or worse, increase the risk of harm through unintended
consequences. Human influence must be considered a source of collateral
risk, the kind that leads to a systemic crisis or exacerbates one. In an
increasingly complex society, governance may not always entail the
delivery of services so much as the coordination and management of
various governmental and nongovernmental entities, and so the lack of
complete control may limit the effectiveness of governance and perhaps
t Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law; M.B.A., University
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1. Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 435, 467 (2005).
2. The South Asia tsunami occurred during the writing of the article; the person-to-
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Katrina occurred after publication.
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constitute a source of risk. Finally, this essay concludes with some brief
proposals, discussion topics more than completed ideas, which may
facilitate further academic and political dialogue on effective governance
and public risk management. They include a catastrophe tax, the elimination
of subsidies for bad risks, reduction of coordination costs, and a clearer
understanding of a "public-private partnership."
I. THE ERA OF MEGA-CATASTROPHES
The world has never been more prosperous, and yet never more risky.
Some dangers like pandemics and wars are old and familiar menaces. Risks
like asteroid strikes are a constant, but science has engendered a new found
appreciation. Risks like homicidal governments are of our own folly, while
perils like nuclear power are born from the very technologies that make our
lives better. Still, some dangers like tsunamis and earthquakes are made
more destructive by the nation's political economy. Catastrophic risks are
parasitic to social development and technological progress, and in the dawn
of the twenty-first century they are old, new and morphed. We live in an era
of mega-catastrophes.
Catastrophe is loosely defined as an extraordinary event marked by
tragedy or great loss.3 I say loosely for risk is a relative concept. "As we can
only 'lose' what is of value to us, risks are a direct reflection of religious,
social, political and economic perceptions of value."4 The spread of
democracy, free markets and peace has led to greater global prosperity.5
Because we are more sensitive to losses and less tolerant of them,6 our
perception of risk has been heightened.7 From an economic perspective, an
3. The dictionary definition of catastrophe is "a momentous tragic event ranging from
extreme misfortune to utter overthrow or ruin." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 214 (1983).
4. CHRISTIAN BRAUNER, Swiss RE, THE RISK LANDSCAPE OF THE FUTURE 19 (2004)
[hereinafter BRAUNER, RISK LANDSCAPE].
5. See generally MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE IDEAS THAT CONQUERED THE WORLD:
PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND FREE MARKETS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2002).
6. See Jon T. Hirschoff, Recent Developments in the Law of Torts: Introduction, 51 IND.
L.J. 463, 463 (1976) (noting that society has developed an "intolerance of bad luck").
7. Political scientists have theorized that war has become less frequent because society
has become less tolerant of losses. See JOHN MUELLER, THE REMNANTS OF WAR (2004); John
Mueller, Why Isn't There More Violence?, 13 SECURITY STUD. 191 (2004); see also MONTY G.
MARSHALL & TED ROBERT GURR, CTR. FOR INT'L DEV. & CONFLICT MGMT., PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2005, at 11 (2005) ("The global trend in major armed conflict has continued to
decrease markedly in the post-Cold War era both in numbers of states affected by major armed
conflicts and in general magnitude.").
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extraordinary event simply means an unusual parametric loss. 8 Although
losses may be great in absolute terms, most catastrophes do not measurably
affect the broader society or economy, at least in an economic sense. Great
misfortune attracts broad interest,9 but in most cases the daily rhythms of
life do not change. In this sense, catastrophes are typically localized tears in
the social fabric. On the other hand, a mega-catastrophe is an event so
severe that the exogenous shock of the event emanates to the broader
society or economy.10 Casualties or economic consequences (or both)
exceed the outer limits of perceived risk. September 11 was a mega-
catastrophe, resulting in a large loss of life coupled with an adverse impact
on the national economy, and it defined a new paradigm of terrorism risk.
Manmade catastrophes can easily match or exceed natural disasters.
12
Before 9/11, the worst manmade disasters had been industrial accidents,
occurrences that achieved iconic stature, e.g., Bhopal, the Exxon Valdez,
and Chernobyl. 3 These accidents raised the public conscience on industrial
8. In insurance terms, a catastrophe is an event that causes $25 million or more in insured
losses and affects a significant number of policyholders. Press Release, ISO Prop. Claim Servs.,
Preliminary Estimate Puts Insured Losses from Hurricane Katrina at $34.4 Billion (Oct. 4,
2005) [hereinafter ISO Press Release] (defined by ISO, a major insurance services firm). This
definition makes it obvious that catastrophes routinely occur. A billion-dollar event is no longer
a momentous occasion. See AURIELA ZANETTI ET AL., Swiss RE, SIGMA No. 1/2004, NATURAL
CATASTROPHES AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS IN 2003, at 9 (Thomas Hess & Aurelia Zanetti eds.,
2004) ("There are strong indications that the billion-dollar loss trend will continue."). Nor is
such an event particularly ruinous for the economy or the insurance industry since both
adequately spread the risks in most cases. Rhee, supra note 1, at 439. "While billion dollar
losses are significant events, they do not pose a systemic risk to the economy." Id. at 439 n.15.
9. The occurrence of recent mega-catastrophes shows that sympathy has a substantial
role in providing material aid as measured by charitable giving. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 439
n.129 (noting the substantial charitable aid given in response to 9/11 and the South Asia
tsunami).
10. In an earlier article, I defined a mega-catastrophe, for the purpose of insurance, as an
event exceeding $20 billion in insurance losses. Id. at 439 n.15. With 9/11 and Katrina
exceeding $30 billion in insurance losses, and as catastrophes of this magnitude become more
frequent, this assessment may become obsolete with time (perhaps sooner than anticipated). Id.
at 438; ISO Press Release, supra note 8.
11. September 11 also had a political and sociological dimension. We cannot
underestimate the deep psychic wound to the nation and the geopolitical consequences. On a
personal note, I was six blocks away in the perceived safety of my home in lower Manhattan
when American Airline Flight 11 hit the North Tower, and I subsequently witnessed the
collapse of both towers. The memories are still haunting.
12. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 447 ("[T]he potential exposure could be equivalent to the
'Big One'-the type of mega-catastrophe that could result in a systemic failure or incapacitation
of the industry .... ").
13. See Bhopal Information Ctr., http://www.bhopal.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2006)
(detailing the events of the 1984 Union Carbide accident at Bhopal, India that killed
approximately 3800 people); Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Tr. Council, http://www.evostc.state.ak.us
(last visited Apr. 2, 2006) (providing facts surrounding the accident); Swiss Agency for Dev. &
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safety, environmental protection, and nuclear risk. Although they resulted in
substantial liability for the misfeasor,1 4 they had no adverse economic
impact on the greater society. 5 The dangers of manmade accidents have
always been a societal risk, but the impact on the broader economy has been
small. September 11 stands apart as the only manmade disaster that has had
a deep, albeit temporary, impact on the economy.1 6 Until Katrina, it was the
largest insurance loss arising from a single event." The severity of the loss
triggered a paradigm shift in that terrorism, once considered discrete, low
intensity violence, metastasized into acts intended to yield catastrophic loss
of life and economic damage.'8 The attacks showed that, even with the use
of low technology weapons and methods, terrorists could inflict mega-
catastrophes.' 9 The possibility of more technically advanced attacks using
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, once the stuff of fiction, is now
real, and such an attack could eclipse the losses from 9/11 by many folds.2"
An intentional act like terrorism is only one source of mega-catastrophic
risk. Catastrophes can result from accidents. Chernobyl and Three Mile
Island showed that industrial accidents could be catastrophic in both lost
Cooperation, http://www.chernobyl.info (last visited Apr. 2, 2006) (providing facts surrounding
the accident).
14. See Bhopal Information Ctr., The Incident, Response, and Settlement,
http://www.bhopal.com/irs.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006) (explaining that Union Carbide
entered into a $470 million settlement with the Indian government for the Bhopal accident);
United Nations & Chernobyl, The Russian Federation, http://www.un.org/ha/chernobyl/
russia.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) (stating that the Russian government paid about $3 billion
to victims of Chernobyl); Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Exxon to Pay Record One
Billion Dollars in Criminal Fines and Civil Damages in Connection with Alaskan Oil Spill
(Mar. 13, 1991), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/valdez/02.htm (explaining that
Exxon settled for $900 million with the government and paid $2.2 billion in clean up expenses).
15. This is not to suggest that these accidents did not affect the industry sector associated
with the accident. Obviously, the perception of nuclear power changed after Chernobyl and
Three Mile Island.
16. Rhee, supra note 1, at 448-54 and accompanying notes.
17. Id. at 438. Asbestos liability has produced the largest insurance loss, but obviously the
liability is from a single product and not a single event. Id. at 443 n.32.
18. Id. at 443-44.
19. See id. at 437-38 n.4 (depicting the potential effects of a well-coordinated suicide
bombing attacks against national retailers and prominent indoor malls throughout the country on
the day after Thanksgiving). Terrorism is unpredictable in the individual instance, but it is not
random. Over the years, terrorists, Islamic and others, have targeted economic assets such as
transportation systems, financial districts, and tourist destinations. Id. at 531 n.448, tbls.1 & 2.
The financial districts in New York and London, the airline industry, and train systems have
been favored targets. The July 7, 2005, attacks against the London subway and bus systems fit
this pattern. See generally CNN, London Terror Special Reports, http://www.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/2005/london.bombing (last visited on Apr. 2, 2006).
20. The worst case scenario is a trillion-dollar loss if weapons of mass destruction are
deployed. Rhee, supra note 1, at 447 n.52.
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lives and potential economic fallout.2' Short of some spectacular event, it is
difficult to imagine a manmade accident on a scale large enough to impart
an exogenous shock on society and economy. That said, intuition tells us
otherwise. Like a virus, risk is parasitic to human development, e.g.,
development of coastlines along storm paths, invention of technology like
genetically modified foods, and concentration of economic resources in
mega-cities. Consider also such vital technology as the Internet and power.
A global failure of the Internet through cyberterrorism or a prolonged power
grid failure would have mega-catastrophic economic impact with minimal
loss of life.22
The first task in risk management is identification and assessment of the
risk. In Catastrophe: Risk and Response, Richard Posner examines the
profound problem of civilization-apocalyptic catastrophes "that threaten
the survival of the human race. ' '23 He identifies a litany of scenarios,
including some obvious risks like pandemics, nuclear fallout, terrorism, and
irreversible environmental degradation (e.g., global warming, loss of
biodiversity and exhaustion of natural resources).24 Augmenting this list are
more exotic perils including killer asteroids, strangelets (subatomic
particles) that condense the earth into a hyperdense sphere in a runaway
chain reaction, omnivorous nanomachines that consume natural life, and
intelligent machines that enslave humans similar to the scenario depicted in
the movie The Matrix.25 Although some of the discussion seems like
speculative conjecture of science fiction,26 the point that risks are varied and
perhaps hidden through distortions of perception is well taken.27
21. See generally R. F. MOULD, CHERNOBYL RECORD: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF THE
CHERNOBYL CATASTROPHE (2000); J. SAMUEL WALKER, THREE MILE ISLAND: A NUCLEAR
CRISIS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004). Both accidents could have been far worse. Three
Mile Island was a contained accident; and while Chernobyl is still the worst nuclear accident in
history, it could have been far worse if it had contaminated Kiev, a city of several million
residents.
22. For example, the 2001 power failures in California caused a productivity loss of $21.8
billion, a private party income loss of $4.5 billion, and 135,000 jobs; and the power failure that
blacked out the northeast United States on August 14, 2003 caused a $75-$100 million loss
from food spoilage alone. BRAUNER, RISK LANDSCAPE, supra note 4, at 15.
23. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 6 (2004).
24. Id. at 21-91.
25. Id. at 30-43, 106-09.
26. Posner discusses the impact of science fiction on our understanding of catastrophes
and ultimately concludes "science fiction probably impedes rather than advances the recognition
of the catastrophic risks that endanger us." Id. at 100-10.
27. This said, I disagree with Posner's proposition that extremely minute risks of
apocalyptic catastrophes can somehow be quantified for the purposes of the ubiquitous cost-
benefit analysis. Posner justifies expenditures to address enormously low frequency, extremely
high severity risks through cost-benefit analysis. To calculate the "expected value" of the loss of
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Although warnings about the potential end of civilization are
provocative, I am more sanguine about our prospects. Perhaps my
seemingly blithe disregard of minute frequency risks reflects the flaws of
human perception that concern Posner, that is, the "the inability of many,
maybe most, people, much of the time, to respond rationally to very-low-
probability risks,"28 but beyond identification of risk is prioritization of
resource allocation. If mega-catastrophes are, by definition, infrequent
events, apocalyptic risks are minute ones. Certain risks are more likely,
relatively speaking; there is greater confidence in the assessment of
probability and so they are less speculative; and mitigation efforts are
identifiable and practicable. For example, the introduction of
nanotechnology into the stream of society, fantastic in concept only a few
years ago, offers great promise in the near future.3 ° But the risk is also
immediate, perhaps unlikely, but less abstract. Here, the cost of mitigation
may simply be the cost of regulation, a familiar burden carried by industry.
On the other hand, certain risks are so remote that their assessment is
speculative and mitigation is impractical. Consider the risk of an asteroid
strike. The probability of a global killer striking the earth has been cited as
once every five hundred thousand to a million years.3' Assuming this to be
true, should it be a policy priority to focus on such a risk? While the threat
is real in the sense of possibilities, the minute frequency suggests that
society has time to develop a response. Risks must be prioritized in terms of
remediation efforts lest the notion of risk consume all societal endeavors.
human civilization, he first assumes the value of each human life at $50,000 and from there
estimates the value of human civilization at $600 trillion. Id. at 167-70. The speculation
continues with the assignment of probability values of highly infrequent events, which are
plucked "out of the air" and made on "arbitrary" and "wild guess" assumptions. Id. at 140-41,
143. To his credit, he notes that while this economic methodology is "defensible," there is "an
urgent need for further research" on the proper values. Id. at 171. While intellectually
provocative, this strained exercise exposes the problem of calculating the incommensurable.
Even if the speculative variables are assumed for argument sake to have a rational basis, the
calculation suggests that the value of human civilization has a market multiple of fifteen times
the capitalization of the global financial markets. See New York Stock Exchange,
http://www.nyse.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) (as of December 31, 2004, the capitalization of
the global financial market was $37.3 trillion; Posner published his book in 2004, making the
end-of-year 2004 figure the appropriate "market" comparable). If business holdings are stripped
out, much of which is held by only a minority of the global population, it would seem that the
remainder of the human species enjoy a paltry premium to the corporate species. As is evident,
such analysis is an economic conundrum, wrapped in a philosophical enigma.
28. POSNER, supra note 23, at 168.
29. For example, Posner reports on a physicist's speculation that the probability of a
strangelet accident is one in a billion. Id. at 30.
30. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601 (2005).
31. POSNER, supra note 23, at 25.
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Among other things, the appropriate time and manner of remediation are
relative to the assessment of the threat and the costs. The question is not
whether we should ignore the risk because it is so infrequent. It is whether
the risk should be addressed now as opposed to the future when, for
example, assessment techniques could be better or the relative cost of
technology will be cheaper.32 Thus, public policy must focus on assessment
and prioritization of risk and response.
All risks are not the same. The combinations of source, frequency,
severity, manageability, predictability, and dependent variables are as
unique as fingerprints. Past experiences have ranged in scale from localized
events to mega-catastrophes. Risks must not only be identified, they must
be assessed for the purpose of prioritization. As Posner suggests, "[u]tterly
trivial probabilities of even large harms must be ignored, or we shall be
devoting all our resources to harm avoidance."33 When a risk is so
infrequent as to make the extrapolation of any data inadequate, its
assessment becomes difficult. Assessment is shaped by empirical data (if
available) and judgment (particularly where data is insufficient).34
32. Technology jumps in quantum leaps, its growth is nonlinear, and today's innovation is
tomorrow's commodity. We see this concept affect everyday economics of consumer choice:
Should I buy that plasma television set now or wait five years when it may sell closer to the
price of an ordinary set? Or consider that the first manned flight was in 1903, lasting 12 seconds
and 120 feet, The Greatest Adventures of All Time-The Fliers, TIME, available at
http://www.time.com/time/2003/adventures/awrightbrothers.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006),
and now in a little more than one hundred years we are considering the regulation of space
tourism. Space Tourism Regulations Are Proposed by the FAA, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2006, at
D7. In the not too distant future, the relative technology cost and feasibility of detecting and
avoiding an asteroid strike will be significantly lower than the cost to implement such a system
now. While continued research in this area may be fruitful, it may be improvident to engage in
an extraordinary effort to mitigate a minute risk when the progress of future technology will
certainly reduce the real cost of such an endeavor in the not too distant future.
33. POSNER, supra note 23, at 141.
34. The concept of probability is often misunderstood. Probability is commonly
understood as a number between 0 and 1, implicitly referring to a concept of statistical
probability, i.e., the limiting value of relative frequency. See RICHARD VON MISES,
PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH 14-20 (Hilda Geiringer ed., George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
2d rev. Eng. ed. 1957) (1928). But as John Maynard Keynes noted, statistical probability is
limited in its concept, and only applies when sufficient data exists to provide a limiting value,
and the underlying premise can be narrowly and symmetrically defined. JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 34, 85 (Dover Publications 2004) (1921). Examples are
the frequency of a particular dye roll or the particular sex of newborns. But in many cases, such
data or premises cannot be discerned, as in the case of assessing individual lawsuits or unique
events or highly infrequent events that would make statistical values meaningless. In these
cases, there can be a probabilistic assessment, but probability is "subjective" and determined
inductively as "the degree of our rational belief." Id. at 34; see also M. G. BULMER, PRINCIPLES
OF STATISTICS 5 (Dover Publications 1979) (1965) (inductive probability is "the degree of belief
which it is rational to place in a hypothesis or proposition on given evidence").
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Perceptions of risk play a vital role.35 Faulty perceptions have led to failed
assessments, and such failures have plagued many endeavors.36
September 11 is now the classic example of a spectacular failure by both
the government and the private market. Both the national security apparatus
and insurers extrapolated past data to perceive terrorism as discrete, low
intensity violence.3 7 Arguably, the first indication that terrorism can be a
serious economic threat occurred on April 21, 1992, when the Irish
Republican Army bombed London and caused $671 million in insurance
losses.38 Since then, governments and insurance companies knew that
terrorism could beget catastrophic losses. In the following year, Swiss Re
warned that terrorism was a "catastrophic risk" and that a single act "can
kill thousands of people [and] cause several billion dollars of damage."3 9 In
1999, the U.S. Commission on National Security, chaired by former
Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart, warned that "Americans will
likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers."40 Despite these
warnings, past experience could not be fully separated from future
possibilities. The possibility of an attack beyond the perceived range of
catastrophic experience could not be imagined, a flaw in the perception of
risk: "individuals are strongly conditioned by their immediate past and limit
their extrapolation to simplified constructs, seeing the future as a mirror of
35. See PAUL SLOvIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 14 (2000).
36. The Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986 is a prime example. Before the disaster,
NASA estimated a catastrophic failure rate between 1/100 and 1/100,000. Report of the
Presidential Comm'n on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, app. F, at 2 (containing
Richard Feynman's Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle) (Feb. 3, 1986). According
to the Nobel laureate Richard Feynman, one of the principle causes of the disaster was NASA's
failure to understand the limitations of a statistical theory of probability. While NASA relied on
a high degree of mission success, it ignored previous instances of difficulties and near accidents.
Id. "It is true that if the probability of failure was as low as 1 in 100,000 it would take an
inordinate number of tests to determine it (you would get nothing but a string of perfect flights
from which no precise figure, other than that the probability is likely less than the number of
such flights in the string so far)." Id. Due to the problems of quantification of risk and statistical
analysis, Feynman hinted that there should be a greater appreciation of "engineering judgment"
in assessing safety, though such judgments cannot be quantified. Id.
37. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 343 (2004) (noting that certain members of the
intelligence community believed that "[iut would be a mistake to redefine counterterrorism as a
task of dealing with 'catastrophic,' 'grand,' or 'super' terrorism"); Rhee, supra note 1, at 444
("In effect, the risk was perceived to be so de minirnis that it was covered for 'free.').
38. Rhee, supra note 1, at 445.
39. Id. (quoting Swiss RE, TERRORISM AND INSURANCE 3 (1993)).
40. Id. at 445 n.43 (quoting THE U.S. COMM. ON NAT'L SEC., 21ST CENTURY NAT'L SEC.
STUDY GROUP, NEW WORLD COMING: AMERICAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (1999),
available at http://www.fas.org/man/docs/nwc/nwc.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2006)).
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that past."'" As in the case of flooding in New Orleans, an intellectual
understanding of the risk was disassociated with a myopic belief that it
cannot happen in the near future absent the confirmation of experience.
Thus, bounded rationality colors our perception of risk and prioritization.
Given the above considerations, what risks should take priority? The
most dangerous risks are the obvious ones. The greatest danger of
catastrophe continues to be war. This is not meant to be a statement on
current events (i.e., the "war on terror"), but simply a reflection of the fact
that the most frequently recurring manmade catastrophe has been
"democide" and war, which collectively killed over two hundred million
people in the twentieth century.42 In this vein, mega-catastrophic terrorism
is simply a mutation of war. Also, the potential of certain manmade
accidents, particularly nuclear and other technological mishaps of the
massive kind, cannot be discounted. These important exceptions aside,
natural catastrophes pose the gravest dangers to society and its economic
order. This point has been confirmed by three catastrophic events of the past
year.
On December 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.0 undersea earthquake near the
coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, triggered the South Asia tsunami, killing over
280,000 people.43 This event reminds us that mega-catastrophes are
fortuitous, random events striking any place, any time. The nations in the
region, though prone to suffer earthquakes and tsunamis, had no warning
41. See Paul Slovic, Howard Kunreuther & Gilbert F. White, Decision Processes,
Rationality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards, in SLOVIC, supra note 35, at 14 (quoting R.W.
Kates, Hazard and Choice Perception in Flood Plain Management, Research Paper No. 78 at
88 (U. of Chicago, Dept. of Geology, 1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
POSNER, supra note 23, at 136 (noting that humans have a difficult time comprehending
extremely low frequency events because we lack current or historical experience).
42. "Democide" is defined as the murder of any person by government. R. J. RUMMEL,
DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 15 tbl.1.6 (1994) (chronicling 169 million deaths from democide in the
twentieth century); R. J. RUMMEL, THE MIRACLE THAT IS FREEDOM: THE SOLUTION TO WAR,
VIOLENCE, GENOCIDE, AND POVERTY 3 (1995) (reporting that 33 million combatants died in
wars in the twentieth century). The philosopher Thomas Hobbes famously posited that the state
of nature was a perpetual cycle of war among people and that the state of war will result in
"continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994) (1668). But see sources
cited supra note 7 (discussing some political scientists' beliefs that war as an idea is becoming
disfavored).
43. Rhee, supra note 1, at 532 n.450. The technical details of the earthquake are available
from the U.S. Geological Survey. See U.S. Geological Survey, Earthquake Hazards Program,
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter (last visited Mar. 11, 2006). The triggering undersea
earthquake was so large that, according to NASA calculations, it minutely affected the earth's
rotation and the length of a day. See Gretchen Cook-Anderson & Dolores Beasley, NASA
Details Earthquake Effects on the Earth, Jan. 10, 2005, available at
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2005/j an/HQ_0501 learthquake.html.
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system, and so the catastrophe was magnified by a failure of the political
economy of the region. 44 The market value of losses paled in comparison to
the epic nature of the human tragedy. 4 5 Even the economic loss as measured
by market value is deceptive. The afflicted regions were underdeveloped,
and shallow penetration of insurance, indicative of less developed
economies, makes the losses especially harsh as homes, resorts, factories,
ships and infrastructure will be made more difficult to rebuild.46 Thus, the
ruinous wake of the tsunami will linger long after the sea reclaimed its
waters and the final death toll is tallied.
On January 27, 2005, researchers confirmed the first cases of person-to-
person transmission of the H5N1 avian flu virus.47 Before, only bird-to-
human transmissions were confirmed.48 "The person-to-person transmission
of one of the most lethal human pathogens in the modem world should
serve as a reminder of the urgent need to prepare for a future influenza
pandemic.,, 49 Human contagion is the first of two conditions necessary for a
pandemic, the second being a virus mutation that facilitates easy
44. The geographic area where the tsunami hit is a part region prone to earthquakes and
tsunamis. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, RING OF FIRE, http://pubs.usgs.gov/
publications/text/fire.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). But the victim nations failed to invest in
an early warning system, presumably because of a lack of economic resources, an inability to
work together without freeriding, or worse a horrible cost-benefit analysis. In the United States,
the Pacific Tsunami and West Coast/Alaska Warning Centers provide a warning screen for
Hawaii, Alaska, and the West Coast. See Nat'l Weather Serv., Pacific Tsunami Warning Center,
http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc (last visited Mar. 11, 2006); Nat'l Weather Serv., West Coast &
Alaska Tsunami Warning Center, http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov (last visited Mar. 11, 2006).
45. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 467 & n.162 (citing Munich Re estimate of $10 billion in
economic losses). Had the event occurred in a developed area like Tokyo or Los Angeles, the
economic devastation would have dwarfed that of 9/11. See id. at 454, 467.
46. See CHRISTIAN BRAUNER, Swiss RE, TSUNAMI IN SOUTH ASIA: BUILDING FINANCIAL
PROTECTION 7 (2005) [hereinafter BRAUNER, TSUNAMI IN SOUTH ASIA] ("However, due to the
very low insurance density, the insured losses will be relatively low compared to the overall
scale of the losses suffered.").
47. See generally Kumnuan Ungchusak et al., Probable Person-to-Person Transmission of
Avian Influenza A (H5N1), 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 333 (2005).
48. The transmissions were confirmed in Hong Kong, where six of eighteen patients died.
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., H5N1 AVIAN INFLUENZA: TIMELINE 1 (Oct. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avianinfluenzafTimeline-28 10a.pdf. Based on current
numbers, the mortality rate is over fifty percent. As of March 10, 2006, the World Health
Organization counted 176 cases of avian flu in humans since December 2003, of which 97
patients died. World Health Org., Confirmed Cases of Avian Influenza A(H5N1),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/country/en/index.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2006).
49. Ungchusak, supra note 47, at 340. Society still lives with the specter of the 1918
Spanish flu pandemic, which killed about 50 million people at a time when the global
population was 1.8 billion. See JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF
THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN HISTORY 396-97 (2004).
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transmission. Given these conditions, fluid labor markets, free trade,
commoditized travel, democratization, and open borders make the perfect
medium for a pandemic. 50 Thus, globalization is a two-faced Jekyll and
Hyde. Although the avian flu is not yet a pandemic, human-to-human
transmission is the realization of a catastrophic condition, foretelling the
eventuality of a pandemic irrespective of whether this virus is the
pathogen.51
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a category 3 hurricane, struck
the Gulf Coast states.5 2 Its winds and storm surges breached the system of
levees protecting New Orleans. The hurricane flooded eighty percent of the
city, killed over 1300 people, and displaced the entire population of a major
American city; 53 insurance losses alone are preliminarily estimated at $34.4
billion, making it the costliest American catastrophe; 54 and the adverse
economic consequences are substantial. 5' These losses are shocking, but the
deeper tragedy is that they were predicted. In 2000, Ted Steinberg wrote:
A dreaded direct hit by a storm of comparable magnitude [a
category 4 hurricane] would likely turn New Orleans into a huge
lake 20 feet deep, with mass death a very real possibility. The
50. The 1918 flu pandemic likely originated in Haskell County, Kansas. See BARRY, supra
note 49, at 98. From this remote part of rural America, the virus spread around the world within
a year due in part to the transportation of millions of soldiers during World War I. Id.
51. The World Health Organization, the National Academy of Sciences (through its
medical arm, the Institute of Medicine), and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention all agree that influenza pandemics are virtually certain to recur. See id. at 450. In a
disturbing development, cases of avian flu have migrated from Asia to Turkey, where as of
January 10, 2006, there have been fifteen confirmed cases. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
AvIAN INFLUENZA - SITUATION IN TURKEY - UPDATE 3 (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006 01 l0a/en/index.html.
52. Katrina was initially thought to be a category 4 hurricane when it made landfall. See
Katrina Was Weaker Than First Thought: Despite Widespread Destruction, Storm Was Only a
Category 3, Study Shows, MSNBC.coM, Dec. 21, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id
/10558235 [hereinafter Katrina Was Weaker]. Hurricanes are rated from 1 to 5 on the Saffir-
Simpson Hurricane Scale. See Nat'l Hurricane Ctr., The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml (last visited Mar. 11, 2006). Wind speed is the
determining factor: category 1, winds 74-95 mph; category 2, winds 96-110 mph; category 3,
winds 111-130 mph; category 4, winds 131-155 mph; category 5, winds greater than 155 mph.
Id.
53. Katrina Was Weaker, supra note 52.
54. ISO Press Release, supra note 8.
55. See Press Release, Risk Management Solutions, RMS Combines Real-time
Reconnaissance with Risk Models to Estimate Katrina Losses (Sept. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.rms.com/newspress/PR_091905_HuKatrinalossmethodology.asp ("RMS expects
private-sector insured losses from Hurricane Katrina to reach $40-$60 billion. Total economic
losses are expected to exceed $125 billion."); Jad Mouawad, Katrina's Shock to the System,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 31 (discussing the sharp spike in oil prices due to Hurricane
Katrina).
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moral of the story is clear: Think twice before assuming that high
death tolls are a thing of the past.56
Given that the levees were only designed to combat a category 3
hurricane, 57 and given that the area has experienced storms more powerful
than this,58 the catastrophe in New Orleans was simply a matter of time.
These recent events-the South Asia tsunami, the avian flu, and
Katrina-show the potential exogenous shock to a society. Their rapid
succession over the past year is symptomatic of the recent trend of
increasing severity and frequency of catastrophes.59 At the turn of the
twenty-first century, we have already seen a number of highly infrequent
events. First was 9/11, which in the context of the twentieth century was a
1/100 year event.60 Katrina was another centennial event, the closest
comparable being the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire.6" An avian
flu pandemic could rival or exceed the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic. And the
South Asia tsunami is one of the deadliest natural catastrophes in recorded
history.62 The increasing frequency and severity of natural catastrophes pose
56. TED STEINBERG, ACTS OF GOD: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF NATURAL DISASTER IN
AMERICA 75 (2000).
57. See infra note 77.
58. Killer hurricanes have long hit the Florida and Gulf Coast regions. In 1900, a category
4 hurricane hit Galveston, Texas, and killed between 8000 and 10,000 people, making it the
worst natural catastrophe in the twentieth century in the U.S. See STEINBERG, supra note 56, at
70.
59. See BRAUNER, RISK LANDSCAPE, supra note 4, at 13 (charting the historic increase in
manmade and natural catastrophes). Before 9/11 and Katrina, the only comparable event to
Hurricane Andrew in terms of insurance losses was the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Rhee,
supra note 1, at 443 n.32. But in little more than a decade Andrew has taken a backseat to both
9/11 and Katrina. A pandemic of the avian flu has the potential to cripple the life insurance
industry, and it was only a matter of chance that the South Asia tsunami did not hit an
economically richer region of the world. These "hits" and "near misses" are consistent with the
pattern of increased destruction from natural catastrophes, a pattern that dates back to the mid-
1980s.
60. Rhee, supra note 1, at 468.
61. See PHILIP L. FRADKIN, THE GREAT EARTHQUAKE AND FIRESTORMS OF 1906, at xi-xvi
(paperback ed. 2005) (discussing many similarities between Hurricane Katrina and the 1906 San
Francisco earthquake and fire). The death toll was approximately 3000 to 5000. Id. at 191. The
earthquake measured 7.7 to 7.9 on the Richter scale and caused $180 million in losses,
constituting 35% of the U.S. primary insurance premiums at the time. PATRIZIA BAUR &
RUDOLPH ENZ, Swiss RE, SIGMA No. 5/2003, REINSURANCE-A SYSTEMIC RISK? 13 (Thomas
Hess & Auriella Zanetti eds., 2003).
62. Tragically, natural catastrophes of such epic scale are not so infrequent, at least in
underdeveloped regions of the world. Catastrophes that kill tens and hundreds of thousands of
victims occur from time to time, infrequent in terms of years but expected in terms of decades.
Since 1970, the ten most deadly natural catastrophes have all taken place in underdeveloped
countries, and several of these have killed over one hundred thousand victims. See Rhee, supra
note 1, at 532 tbl.4. These regions are not necessarily more prone to natural catastrophes.
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the most immediate, tangible risk, and they portend a new era of mega-
catastrophes.
II. CATASTROPHE AND CHOICE
It is plausible that the cluster of extreme events mentioned above is
random. To see patterns in randomness where there are none is a common
phenomenon. But if we accept that catastrophe's causality and consequence
are not independent of human influence, the recent events could portend a
trend towards greater magnitude events and evince society's increasing
susceptibility to mega-catastrophes. The common perception is that natural
catastrophes are a matter of random fate, something beyond our control.
When disaster strikes, "the emphasis has been on making nature the
villain., 63 This convention conforms to preconceived notions of disasters
(thus "an act of God") and provides a convenient explanation to deflect
attention away from the human choices that may have contributed to the
loss.64 Of course the causes of certain natural events like earthquakes or
tsunamis are independent. But it is a mistake to believe that causality and
consequence are always divorced from human influence and policy choices.
In terms of causality, climate change is the primary concern. The
phenomenon of global warming is an accepted scientific fact. 65 The theory
is that warming results from the accumulation of greenhouse gases.66
Evidence supports the theory that human-induced global warming is a
contributing cause of severe weather patterns experienced in recent years.67
Rather, the consequences of natural disasters are amplified by the political economy of the
region, as seen in the lack of an early warning system in the South Asia tsunami, low standards
of building construction and other preventative measures, and perhaps overpopulation in
catastrophe prone areas. Major disasters in the United States rarely see a death toll in excess of
several hundred.
63. STEINBERG, supra note 56, at xxiii.
64. Steinberg notes that the randomness of natural catastrophes has served as a convenient
object of blame deflecting potential criticism of individual choices and government action that
contributed to the scale of the consequences. Id. at 47-68, 79-96.
65. See generally Sydney Levitus et al., Warming of the World Ocean, 287 SCIENCE 2225
(Mar. 24, 2000) (noting the warming of the world's oceans to a depth of two miles in five
decades).
66. THE INT'L CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE, MEETING THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE TASKFORCE 1 (Jan. 2005)
[hereinafter CLIMATE CHALLENGE]; HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL, THE CENTER FOR HEALTH AND
THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE CHANGE FUTURES: HEALTH, ECOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC
DIMENSIONS 4 (Paul R. Epstein & Evan Mills eds., Nov. 2005) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE
FUTURES].
67. CLIMATE CHANGE FUTURES, supra note 66, at 4. See Tim P. Barnett et al., Penetration
of Human-Induced Warming into the World's Oceans, 309 SCIENCE 284 (July 2005); Richard A.
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This belief in the scientific community is gaining support, and no critical
mass of scientific literature has emerged to show that human activity is not
a significant cause of global warming or that global warming is not a
significant cause of severe weather patterns. 8 There is at least a well-
documented correlation between global warming and increased severe
weather patterns in the past several decades.69
The International Climate Change Taskforce announced in a recent
policy statement: "Climate change represents one of the most serious and
far-reaching challenges facing humankind in the twenty-first Century. 70
While the debate in the scientific community continues,7 the private
market, the best assessor of risk ever devised by man, is behaving
consistently with the emerging scientific belief. The concern is based on
experience. Insurance losses have seen dramatic increases in catastrophe
related losses since the late 1980s.72 Prompted by these losses and business
necessity, the insurance industry has accepted the link between global
warming and severe weather patterns, and it is innovating financial products
and insurance solutions to manage the risk and profit from it.73 Insurance is
not the only aspect of business that has been affected. Severe weather
profoundly changes the competitive landscape of business and affects,
among other things, supply, demand, price, financial planning, logistics and
energy sourcing. Like the insurance market, the private sector appears to be
accepting the idea that global warming could impact profits. Slow
adaptation is already evident. The private sector is making substantial
investments, innovations and policy decisions to address global warming
and to profit from it.74
Kerr, Is Katrina a Harbinger of Still More Powerful Hurricanes?, 309 SCIENCE 1807 (Sept.
2005); Kevin Trenberth, Uncertainty in Hurricanes and Global Warming, 308 SCIENCE 1753
(June 2005).
68. While "there is no sound theoretical basis for drawing any conclusions about how
anthropogenic climate change affects hurricane numbers ...trends associated with human
influences are evident in the environment in which hurricanes form, and our physical
understanding suggests that the intensity of and rainfalls from hurricanes are probably
increasing." Trenberth, supra note 67, at 1754.
69. See supra note 66.
70. CLIMATE CHALLENGE, supra note 66, at 1.
71. See Valerie Bauerlein, Hurricane Debate Shatters Civility of Weather Science, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 2, 2006, at Al.
72. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 500 & n.314 (noting increased insurance losses); ZANETTI
ET AL., supra note 8, at 5 (same); see also Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309
SCIENCE 1040 (Aug. 2005) (discussing insurance issues in an era of climate change). The losses
are also attributable to increased property values and population of high risk areas. Id. at 1042.
73. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 500-05 (discussing natural catastrophe securitizations).
74. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ball, Deep in the Sahara, BP Tries to Put Dent in Global Warming,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2005, at Al (discussing the oil industry and global warming); Abrahm
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In terms of consequences of natural catastrophes, they are often made
worse by human choices. This is the central theme in Steinberg's Acts of
God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America: "In truth,
however, natural calamities frequently do not just happen; they are
produced through a chain of human choices and natural occurrences, and in
this sense they form a legitimate topic for social and historical study."75 The
destruction of New Orleans was as much a manmade disaster as it was a
natural one. The seeds of disaster were sown many years ago. Realizing that
the greatest natural threat to New Orleans is a hurricane induced storm
surge, Congress authorized the construction of the levee system in 1965.76
The system was designed to combat a storm roughly equivalent to a fast-
moving category 3 hurricane, a storm thought to strike coastal Louisiana
once every 200 years.71 This probability is based on obsolete data and of
course does not incorporate factors such as global warming. Since the mid-
1980s, catastrophic losses, much of which were tropical storm driven, have
increased significantly.78 In 1992 Hurricane Andrew, a category 5 hurricane,
devastated the Florida coast and at the time inflicted the most severe single
event insurance loss in the modem era.79 In 2004, a series of four hurricanes
hit the American southeast and Florida in a matter of several weeks,
collectively causing more insurance losses than Andrew.8 ° In 2005, a record
three hurricanes, including Katrina, reached category 5 status.8' Since the
Lustgarten, Getting Ahead of the Weather: How Companies are Protecting Themselves Against
the Effects of Extreme Events and Long-Term Changes, FORTUNE, Feb. 7, 2005, at 87
(discussing the use of financial futures to offset weather related disruptions to business
operations). British Petroleum has made environment concerns a part of its marketing strategy.
See, e.g., BP Global, http://www.bp.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2006) (corporate website having a
section on "Environment and Society"). Even investment banking firms, which seemingly
would not be affected by global warming as their chief product is the delivery of intellectual
services, have realized that global warming may have dramatic consequences on the orderly
working of the global markets in the long-term. See Claudia H. Deutsch, Goldman to Encourage
Solutions to Environmental Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at C3 (discussing how
investment banks like Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan Chase have recognized global warming
and adopted environment conscious policies).
75. STEINBERG, supra note 56, at xix.
76. Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 1073 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-5).
77. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-322T, HURRICANE PROTECTION:
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEVEE MAINTENANCE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE FOR THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN PROJECT 4 (2005) [hereinafter GAO, STATUTORY
AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK].
78. See sources cited supra note 72.
79. Rhee, supra note 1, at 532 tbl.3.
80. Id. at 532 n.449 (Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne).
81. See The 2005 Season is Finally Over!, WEATHER.COM, Feb 27, 2006,
http://www.weather.connewscenter/tropicalV?from=wxcenternews (describing hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma) (last visited Apr. 1, 2006).
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1970s the frequency of category 4 and 5 hurricanes and the destructiveness
of tropical storms have doubled.8 2
The experience since 1965 suggests that the original probability
assumption was wrong. Of course this is hindsight bias. The point is not that
the original assumption was wrong (who can predict weather patterns 30 or
40 years into the future?), but that no allowance was made for the
possibility of error. There was no "cushion" built into the engineering
standard. The 1/200 year assessment, which simply means that in any given
year the city had a 0.5% chance of a catastrophic breach, was the safety
margin. In short, the decision to set the engineering standard at a 1/200 year
event was shortsighted.83 A severe hurricane striking the Gulf region was a
distinct possibility, if not a probability. In recent years the government
realized the possibility of a category 4 or 5 hurricane striking the region.84
The only action taken, however, was to conduct a "pre-feasibility" study to
gauge the cost and time required for a "full feasibility study" (this study
ultimately concluded that a full study would cost $8 million and take at least
five years).8" Thus a chain of decisions, dating back to 1965, contributed to
the natural catastrophe. Since causality and consequences are intimately
intertwined with human choice, it is an open question whether the flooding
of New Orleans was caused by a natural event or a man-made condition.
Like two fires that converge to burn a village, both factors substantially
contributed to the mega-catastrophe.
Human influence on natural catastrophes is not limited to government
action (or inaction). Population and wealth play a large part in determining
the scope of a catastrophe. Population growth continues to be a source of
systemic risk since Robert Malthus first studied the subject.8 6 Since 1900,
the world population has grown from 1.6 to 6.5 billion.87 The world is also
more peaceful, prosperous and wealthy as these matters have become a
moral imperative.8 8 Frequency and severity of catastrophes have increased
82. CLIMATE CHANGE FUTURES, supra note 66, at 4.
83. The Dutch built their system of dikes to withstand a one in 10,000 year event. John
Schwartz, Category 5: Levees Are Piece of a $32 Billion Pie, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at Al.
84. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-1050T, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND VICINITY HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT 8 (2005).
85. Id.
86. THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (Philip
Appleman ed., Norton Critical ed. 1976) (1798). Although written in 1798, Malthus's theory of
population growth still has relevance today. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 23, at 68-71
(discussing the effects of population growth on catastrophes).
87. Leonard David, World Population Hits 6.5 Billion, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 25, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/I 1545564; see also POSNER, supra note 23, at 68.
88. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 9-11
(2005). See generally MANDELBAUM, supra note 5.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
38:0581] GOVERNANCE AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA 597
because, among other things, more lives and value are at risk. Like
Newton's law of motion, social progress and risk are opposite forces that
exert pressure on each other. As human life and economic livelihood are
valued more in a world that has grown more prosperous and peaceful,8 9 we
become more susceptible to greater catastrophes. 90
Socioeconomic and demographic trends influence the consequences of a
disaster.9' Population and development in disaster prone areas is a matter of
choice. It is no accident that real estate values are the highest in the coasts,
and that the nation's current real estate boom has disproportionately
increased values in certain desirable locations like Florida and California.92
The point is not to condemn people who chose to live along fault lines or
coastlines for the disasters that befall them. In most situations, ripping out
one's social and economic roots for the sole consideration of avoiding a
catastrophic risk could be an irrational choice,93 and it is impractical to
believe that large cities like New Orleans can be lifted from their foundation
and moved to higher ground.94 But human choices impact the severity of the
consequences. It is therefore appropriate to analyze the costs and incentives
created through market forces or government action.
Catastrophes raise the issue of who will or should pay. The burden
invariably falls on three candidates: the victim, the insurer (if any), the
89. In light of recent American military ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, some may
disagree with my assertion that the world is more peaceful. But a number of political scholars
have noted that the idea of peace is becoming the accepted norm, though there are still many
flashpoints of violence. See generally supra notes 5, 7 and accompanying text.
90. A repetition of the 1923 earthquake in modem Tokyo would cause losses up to
seventy-five percent of the Japanese gross domestic product. BRAUNER, RISK LANDSCAPE, supra
note 4, at 15 (OECD estimate). Regarding the South Asia tsunami, Swiss Re observed that
increased development and population along coastlines "aggravate the potential scale of future
events." BRAUNER, TSUNAMI IN SOUTH ASIA, supra note 46, at 6.
91. "As recognized by insurers and others, migration of populations to flood- and fire-
prone areas, increasing reliance on vulnerable electric power grids, and rising material wealth
are among the many drivers." Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCIENCE
1040, 1041 (2005).
92. See Les Christie, Real Estate: Busts Don't Follow Booms, CNN.CoM, May 4, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/03/real-estate/financing/boom-bust (noting substantial valuation
gains in California and Florida); Top Housing Markets: Fourth-Quarter Numbers are in. See
How Your Town Stacks Up., CNN.cOM, http://money.cnn.com/pf/featuresllists/nar_4q (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006) (listing many California and Florida regions having top valuation gains).
93. STEINBERG, supra note 56, at 98 ("For all the people who consciously chose to make
the floodplain their home, many more were forced to do so. The latter were compelled to live
there by economic exigencies, by the simple fact that cheap, flood-prone land can be a magnet
for the poverty stricken, who are forced to live in the shadow of disaster.").
94. Id. at 119 ("While moving may be a realistic option for small communities, larger
cities that owe their existence to elaborate water control structures are unlikely to find it
appealing.").
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government (taxpayers), or a combination thereof.95 Without government
action, private parties will rationally apportion risk and loss through
insurance (given the limits of information). Policyholders and insurers tend
to allocate risk efficiently in the long-term, meaning that the market
accurately prices risk.96 This is not to suggest that markets operate perfectly,
as short-term price inefficiencies exist. Price and value may at times be
misaligned. It is a paradox of the market that a certain degree of mispricing
is a necessary condition to a liquid, efficient market. 97 For example, the pre-
9/11 insurance market operated on an erroneous price paradigm, grossly
underpricing terrorism risk.98 But markets adjust and over time a new
equilibrium is reached. This is seen in the market reactions to major
catastrophes including Hurricane Andrew, the Northridge earthquake, and
9/11.99 Once price and value are closely aligned, the allocation of risk places
appropriate incentives on parties and "market discipline" is imposed on
them. Moral hazards are reduced, and appropriate mitigation and avoidance
measures are instituted."° When, however, government action through
subsidized insurance or ex post subsidies is introduced, that discipline may
give way to price distortions that incentivize inappropriate risk-taking.'l'
The government flood insurance program is a good example. Flooding is
such a high risk that private insurers exclude coverage, 102 leaving property
95. Charity is increasingly becoming a substantial factor. See supra note 9. See generally
Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer, Reinhard Mechler & Georg Pflug, Refocusing Disaster Aid, 309
SCIENCE 1044 (2005) (discussing disaster aid).
96. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 492 ("The private market is more nimble, intelligent, and
diligent than government in turning a profit and improving efficiency within a market.").
97. See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 532 (1986) ("What's needed for a liquid
market causes prices to be less efficient."). Black is the co-author, along with Myron Scholes, of
the Black-Scholes option pricing model. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of
Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973). In 1997, Scholes won the
Nobel Prize in Economics. Black's death in 1995 made him ineligible to receive the award.
98. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 444 ("In effect, the risk was perceived to be so de minimis
that it was covered for 'free."'). For example, before 9/11, Chicago's O'Hare Airport had a
$750 million terrorism policy at an annual premium of $125,000. Howard Kunreuther &
Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Challenges for Terrorism Risk Insurance in the United States, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 201, 203 (2004). After 9/11, the coverage was reduced to $150 million at a
premium of $6.9 million. Id.
99. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 448-54 (discussing the effects of exogenous shock on
pricing in the insurance industry).
100. See id. at 490 n.274 (noting the voluntary prophylactic measures taken by businesses
against terrorism risk).
101. See id. at 485-96 (discussing the effects of subsidized insurance on private behavior).
102. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-119, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENHANCE OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 1 (2005) [hereinafter GAO, IMPROVEMENTS
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owners three choices: assume the risk, eliminate it by vacating or selling the
property, or take mitigation measures. In 1968 Congress changed this
dynamic by enacting the National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA). 113 It
believed that a flood insurance program with "large-scale participation of
the Federal Government and carried out to the maximum extent practicable
by the private insurance industry is feasible and can be initiated."' 1 4 In
return for subsidized insurance, Congress required communities to pass
laws and regulations on land use in floodplain areas.1 °5 The insurance aspect
of the program is serviced by private insurers who are in turn managed by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Flood insurance has
proven to be a well intentioned, ill-conceived, poorly executed idea. 0 6 The
problem is multi-dimensional, but it starts with underwriting.
[T]he program, by design, is not actuarially sound because
Congress authorized subsidized insurance rates to be made
available for policies covering some properties to encourage
communities to join the program. As a result, the program does
not collect sufficient premium income to build reserves to meet the
long-term future expected flood losses. 1
07
Policyholders pay premiums that represent about thirty-five to forty
percent of the true actuarial risk."0 8 As a result, the program is not
independently sustainable because it was designed to be a loss-making
endeavor.0 9 Nor is the final cost-benefit analysis encouraging. According to
FEMA, the government saves $1 in ex-post-disaster aid payments for every
$3 of flood insurance claims paid. 10 Why sustain an expensive ex ante
NEEDED IN NFIP]. According to the Government Accountability Office, "[n]inety percent of all
natural disasters in the United States involve flooding." Id.
103. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2000)).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (2000).
105. See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, National Flood Insurance Program: Top 10
Things State Legislators Can Do, http://www.fema.gov/nfip/leg-0.shtm#C (last visited Mar. 1,
2006).
106. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 492-93 & nn.288-90.
107. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-174T, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY: CHALLENGES FACING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 5
(2005) [hereinafter GAO, CHALLENGES FACING THE NFIP].
108. Id. at 4.
109. See id. at 5 ("As of August 2005, the program had borrowed $300 million to cover an
estimated $1.8 billion in claims from the major disasters of 2004, including hurricanes Charley,
Frances, Ivan and Jean."). After Hurricane Katrina, legislation was enacted to expand the
borrowing capacity from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion through fiscal year 2008 in anticipation of
major losses from flood claims related to Hurricane Katrina. National Flood Insurance Program
Enhanced Borrowing Authority Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-65, 119 Stat. 1998 (2005).
110. GAO, CHALLENGES FACING THE NFIP, supra note 107, at 2.
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insurance program when a cheaper ex post welfare distribution is available?
The government would answer that flood plain management and mitigation
efforts mandated by the NFEP save about $1 billion in flood damage each
year."' However, this figure is deceptive because it is unknown whether the
losses would have occurred without the NFIP. Losses and flood insurance
are codependent factors, and so some of the "savings" are illusory and
should be better characterized as a cost. "12
The problem is not limited to the NFLP. Government insurance programs
have historically had adverse economic effects. They have "crowded out"
the private sector with infeasible pricing, "anesthetized" market
innovations, and created moral hazards." 3 These effects are also seen in
terrorism insurance. After 9/11, the government enacted the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 ("TRIA"),1 4 an ex ante federal backstop for
catastrophic losses." 5 TRIA was enacted as a temporary price stabilization
measure, allowing "a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize,
resume pricing of such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future
losses." ' 16 The program had a sunset date of December 31, 2005."' In my
earlier article, I noted that government insurance would extinguish the
private market's incentive to innovate and that "[m]arket anesthetization is
already evident in the failure to develop a private market solution (the
second of TRIA's goals) and the industry's lobbying efforts to extend
TRIA."' "8 The concern was corporate entitlement capture. Recently, this
prediction came true as intense lobbying by the insurance and big
businesses led to the extension of TRIA for another two years," 9 proving
that in the arena of government insurance "nothing is more permanent than
the temporary."' 121
1ll. Id.
112. I am unaware of any study that decouples these factors to provide a true picture of the
NFIP's costs and savings. An independent study by an agency like the GAO, if even feasible,
would be helpful.
113. Rhee, supra note 1, at 490-91. See generally Anne Gron & Alan 0. Sykes, Terrorism
and Insurance Markets: A Role for the Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447 (2003);
Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism--and Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV.
268 (2003).
114. Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101(a)-(b), 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
115. Rhee, supra note 1, at 454-59 (describing the provisions of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002).
116. Id. at 456 (quoting Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 101 (b)).
117. Id. at 455 n.93.
118. Id. at491.
119. Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-144, 119 Stat. 2660
(2005).
120. Rhee, supra note 1, at 488 n.265 (quoting HOWARD KUNREUTHER & ERWANN
MICHAEL-KERJAN, THE WHARTON SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEALING
600 [Ariz. St. L.J.
38:0581] GOVERNANCE AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA 601
Although the new extension increases the trigger amounts and
deductibles, it has had little effect in reducing premiums from current
levels. 12 There is an explanation for this curious market reaction: insurers
are well-capitalized even without a federal backstop and thus rates are
unaffected by the extension. This suggests that the federal program may not
have produced lower priced premiums. Insurance is a cyclical business, and
the pricing of premiums is subject to the ebb and flow of the supply and
demand of capital. The greater is the amount of capital held, the lower
premiums will be. Because the insurance industry is well-capitalized and
indeed holds more capital now than before 9/11, prices may have reached
levels reasonably comparable to what market rates would have been without
the federal program. 2 2 In other words, insurance companies may have had
to underwrite terrorism policies given the demand for them and the
abundant capital. No doubt insurers would have insisted on tighter coverage
limitations, but even these restrictions may have ultimately loosened under
long-term price competition. By replacing insurance capital with
government funds at the extreme range of potential liability, the private
industry underwrites and manages extreme terrorism risk but the
government bears a substantial portion of the loss, an arrangement that over
the long term may closely resemble the national flood insurance program.
If the problems of government insurance boil down to a matter of
welfare distribution, the issue is simply a policy question on the appropriate
use of taxpayer funds. But by affecting incentives and creating moral
hazards, government programs touch the issue of risk amplification.
Consider again flood insurance. Although the mortality rate from natural
catastrophes has been declining, deaths from floods have actually increased
in the latter half of the twentieth century.'23 Katrina is consistent with this
trend. The increased death toll coincides with substantial efforts by the
government to manage flood risk, including the NFIP and the New Orleans
levee construction project. I am not suggesting that there is direct causation,
but certainly these programs are an influencing factor. Too often, "federal
flood insurance encouraged people to rebuild where they were destined to
meet ruin again and again, a fact borne out by . .. repetitive claims."'124
wrH EXTREME EVENTS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR TERRORISM RISK COVERAGE IN THE U.S. 12
(2004)).
121. Liam Pleven, Terrorism-Insurance Premiums Are Expected to Remain Steady, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 31, 2005, at A3.
122. Rhee, supra note 1, at 461. Because insurers are regulated and limited in their
underwriting by the amount of capital, capital determines the amount of capacity (i.e., supply of
insurance premiums) in the market. Id. at 462-64.
123. STEINBERG, supra note 56, at 73-74.
124. Id. at 97.
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Because the poor have little economic choice in habitation, they bear the
brunt of the costs associated with this destructive cycle. 2 ' Thus, the well-
intended risk mitigation has not come to pass, and, quite the opposite, the
program has incentivized the habitation and building in hazardous areas,
putting more value at risk and raising the cost of ex post disaster assistance.
HI. LIMITATIONS IN GOVERNANCE
Although the government is the first place people look to in times of
crisis, government action is not a panacea. In fact, the opposite can be true.
Government actions have been at the center of some of the greatest human
catastrophes. On the extreme end of the scale is intentional misconduct like
democide. On the other end of the scale is ineptitude, indifference, or
negligence. While the degree of moral culpability here is not imbued with
the bane of evil, the banality of bureaucracy can injure or kill equally. The
question of legal liability is distinct from moral culpability, and culpability
may be distinct from accountability.'26 Only the government has the
centralized power to preempt others, to coerce action, to act in unison, and
to marshal enormous resources; and yet due to incompetence, indifference
or inertia, it has often failed in preventing or mitigating catastrophes.
Government action then in times of crisis can be a poisoned tonic, the
125. See id. at 105 (stating that flood insurance has "subsidized the poor in a place where
real estate capitalism had forced them to live-on the margins, in the cheapest, riskiest and most
flood-prone land").
126. Under American law, there is no criminal liability for errors arising from the
discretionary decisions associated with the emergency management. In other parts of the world,
such liability may attach to public officials. See Violaine Roussel, New Moralities of Risk and
Political Responsibility, in RISK AND MORALITY 117-42 (Richard V. Ericson & Aaron Doyle
eds., 2003) (noting a convergence of criminal and political responsibility in France). Moreover,
it is settled tort doctrine that the government does not owe a general duty of care to the public at
large. See, e.g., Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C. 1990); Riss v. City of
New York, 240 N.E.2d 860, 861 (N.Y. 1968); cf Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)
(2000) (providing that the government retains immunity from suits "based upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused").
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perceived remedy that can in fact be a harmful agent.'27 Thus, it is a source
of systemic risk in the management of catastrophes. 1
28
In an increasingly complex world, where nongovernmental entities have
increased in influence, the government no longer has top-down vertical
control of its programs and services. The political scientist Donald Kettl
calls this phenomenon "devolution:'
129
In doing their work, American governments at all levels became
increasingly interconnected with private corporations and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that share in the task of
delivering public services. Government policy thus became the
product of how government managed its relationships with an
increasingly devolved system. 130
Decisionmaking, execution, capability, and power have diffused. Even
the business of wartime combat, a quintessentially sovereign function, has
given way to a private-public partnership. 131 Increased horizontal and
vertical connectivity among government and nongovernmental entities
makes the delivery of government services particularly difficult in times of
crisis when speed, efficiency, and coordination mean the difference between
life and death.
The consequence of devolution is seen in the response to Katrina. It is
undisputed that "the system, at every level of government, was not well-
coordinated, and was overwhelmed in the first few days."'32 Katrina is one
of those rare events where the fault, if not admitted, is so obvious that the
government has conceded a tacit nolo contendre.3 3 The litany of mistakes
127. This paradox may be unique to the American experience and the theory of government
where the deep rooted distrust of government power conflicts with the natural tendency of
people to look to the government for relief in times of crisis. DONALD F. KETTL, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
AMERICA 27-28 (2002).
128. See Rolf Nebel, Regulations as a Source of System Risk: The Need for Economic
Impact Analysis, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 273, 281-82 (2004).
129. KETrL, supra note 127, at 129.
130. Id. at 118.
131. See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED
MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003).
132. President George W. Bush, President Discusses Hurricane Relief in Address to the
Nation (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/
20050915-8.html.
133. Id.; U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA 1 (2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/
mainreport.pdf (stating that Congress found "failures at all levels of government") [hereinafter
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE]; Edward Alden, Government's Katrina Preparations "Were All
Wrong", FIN. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005 (quoting Presidential Advisor, Frances Townsend, "It turns
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are well known-the failure to appreciate the magnitude of the impending
disaster, to communicate to the public, to evacuate the area, to coordinate
among governmental branches, to implement search and rescue, to provide
supplies, to plan a post-disaster relief operation, to procure temporary
housing facilities, etc. 134 In the coming months and years, historians will
document the exact details of the systemic failure. It is easy to blame public
officials in hindsight for their personal failings as they may personify the
institutional failure, 3 5  but Katrina shows the complexity of crisis
management. The power to evacuate, transport, communicate, authorize
funding, mobilize the military, search and rescue, police, contract with
private suppliers, manage delivery of supplies and services, etc., was
diffused throughout the various branches of government and
nongovernmental entities.
The inefficiency of government action is contrasted with private
action.'36 Before the storm hit, private companies prepared days in
advance.137 Immediately after the storm, they resumed normal operations
even in the most devastated areas within days.'38 Companies like Wal-Mart,
FedEx and Microsoft were quick to provide charitable services in the
out we were all wrong, we had not adequately anticipated [the storm]."); see also Evan Thomas,
The Lost City: What Went Wrong, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9179587/site/newsweek/page/2 ("How the system failed is a
tangled story, but the basic narrative is becoming clearer: hesitancy, bureaucratic rivalries,
failures of leadership from city hall to the White House and especially bad luck combined to
create a morass."). In this regard, it is ironic that the government has charged the owners of a
nursing home with negligent homicide for the drowning deaths of thirty-four residents and the
basis for this charge is the failure to evacuate the residents upon notice of an impeding deadly
storm. See Shaila Dewan & Al Baker, Owners of Nursing Home Charged in Deaths of 34, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at Al.
134. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 133, at 1-5 (detailing the systemic failure).
135. In the case of Katrina, Michael Brown, the head of FEMA, has come to personify the
failure of the government. See Scott Shane, Michael DeWayne Brown: Facing Blame in a
Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A22; Mimi Hall, Testimony: FEMA Chief Slow to Grasp
Enormity of Katrina, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 2005, at 6A.
136. Compared to the speed and efficiency of private organizations, "government was
abysmally slow to react." Dennis Behreandt, Katrina Exposes Fatal Flaws; Hurricane Katrina
Did More Than Destroy the Gulf Coast. It Laid Bare the Failure of Government at All Levels,
NEW AM., Oct. 3, 2005, at 12.
137. See Justin Fox, A Meditation on Risk: Hurricane Katrina Brought Out the Worst in
Washington and the Best in Business, FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 2005, at 50, 52; Devin Leonard, 'The
Only Lifeline Was the Wal-Mart', FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 2005, at 74, 77.
138. A day after the storm, Home Depot opened twenty-two of thirty-three stores in the
impact zone, and within a week only four stores were closed (four out of nine stores in New
Orleans). Fox, supra note 137, at 52. Home Depot's feat was not so unique. Hurricane Katrina
shut down 126 Wal-Mart stores in the Gulf Coast area, and as of September 16, 2005, all but
thirteen stores were operational. Leonard, supra note 137, at 76-77.
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absence of government services." 9 It is reported that private firms offered
assistance to the government in its disaster relief efforts but it was slow to
act on the offers, 4° presumably because of incompetence, indifference or
bureaucratic pride. Many months after the storm, when the full extent of the
disaster was apparent to all and when the motivation to make right would
have been the greatest, private contractors were far quicker to provide the
same remedial services (cleanup) to the region than their government
counterparts. 141
It is easy to see how the managerial, logistical and technological
expertise of large, sophisticated private firms can provide superior services
under crisis conditions.1 42 With the exception of the military, which operates
under a hierarchical, centralized command structure, government agencies
simply cannot compete with the technical expertise of assessing risk,
allocating resources, taking decisive action, and holding individuals
accountable. The corporate organization is marked by centralized
management and clear lines of communication, responsibility and
accountability. If management expertise is the "brains" of a business
operation, entrepreneurial spirit is the self-interested "heart." I do not
suggest that any single private entity would have done better than the
government had it been in charge of the crisis management of the Gulf
Coast region."' Nor do I suggest that it is possible for large private firms to
assume primary responsibility of public crisis management. The task may
have been too great for any single entity, public or private. But one wonders
139. See Artelia C. Covington, Companies Offer Donations, Services to Hurricane Katrina
Relief Efforts, TRANSPORT ToPics, Sept. 12, 2005, at 5; Rich Karlgaard, Wonderful Wealth,
FORBES, Oct. 10, 2005, at 43; Bill Steigerwald, Government Can Take Lesson From Wal-Mart,
PrrrSBURGH TRIBUNE-REv., Oct. 14, 2005.
140. See Jonathan Birchall et al., Hurricane Katrina: Federal Agency "Slow" to Accept
Business Help, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at 6 ("From Wal-Mart's satellite-based
communications systems to FedEx's aircraft, [U.S.] business has in some cases managed to
provide a swifter response to the initial impact of hurricane Katrina than the federal and state
authorities. But critics of the handling of the crisis by government agencies said they were slow
in accepting offers of help."); Behreandt, supra note 136, at 13 ("Incredibly, in some cases the
federal response has been to stop aid from getting through. According to the Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette, Homeland Security officials were blocking the Red Cross from New Orleans.").
141. Private contractors hired by the government have been far more effective in the Gulf
Coast cleanup than the Army Corps of Engineers. See Eric Lipton, On Gulf Coast, Cleanup
Differs Town to Town, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at Al.
142. Corporations like these routinely hire the best business and technical minds, including
PhDs in operations, applied mathematics, management sciences, finance, and information
technology. Successful corporations can be viewed as thinktanks with execution capabilities.
143. "Markets and corporations may be the greatest risk processors mankind has yet
devised, but that isn't to suggest that corporations can or should supplant government. Elected
officials have it much tougher than CEOs: Home Depot had to get its stores open, not evacuate
a city." Fox, supra note 137, at 52.
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what might have been the result or how many lives could have been saved if
a corporate-like management team with a clear mandate, supported by the
authority and virtually unlimited resources of the government, had been
tasked with the disaster preparation and relief efforts. In explaining the
difference between the efficiency of private actors' reaction to Katrina and
that of the government's, the economist Thomas Sowell observed in an
editorial:
In both emergency times and normal times, governments have
different incentives than private businesses. More fundamentally,
human beings will usually do more for their own benefit than for
the benefit of others. The desire to make money usually gets
people in gear faster than the desire to help others. 144
This thought simply harkens back to Adam Smith's original point that
"[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest."'45
While it is unfair to compare the tasks of coordinating a multi-state, multi-
government disaster planning with protecting the businesses of even a large
firm like Wal-Mart, it is also undisputed that the "failure of initiative," a
perplexing "passivity" of government, magnified the consequences. 146 A
comparison to the response of private actors under the same conditions
shows no such paralysis.
IV. EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION
At issue is not the theory of government, arguably the more interesting
intellectual issue. Here rich are the ideas advanced by legal and political
science scholars. Katrina, however, exposed the weakness in the practice of
government, the mundane details in which services are delivered and
programs are managed efficiently. The problem lies in management,
communication, operations, organizational behavior, and structure. Here the
field of study is an academic orphan, not finding a comfortable home in
schools of law, political science, or business. I suppose the most applicable
scholarship in these administrative issues is management study, but even
here the application to governance would require an interdisciplinary
approach as efficiency and profit often give way to welfare and public good.
144. Thomas Sowell, Observe Private Businesses' Quick Response to Katrina, DESERET
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 29, 2005, at A15.
145. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 15 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library 1994) (1776).
146. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 133, at 359.
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The modem theory of public administration traces its roots to The Study
of Administration, an essay published in 1887 by Woodrow Wilson, then a
thirty-one year old Princeton University professor.'47 Wilson noted that in a
democratic form of government "the hardest of hard things is to make
progress."' 4 8 To solve this problem, he espoused a system in which elected
officials set policy and this policy would be executed by a hierarchical
structure managed by a corps of civil servants.' 49 The idea assumed a
vertically integrated services delivery system with the government at the
control. In the twenty-first century, these ideas seem obsolete as the process
of devolution has undermined the Wilsonian tradition. 5 Albeit the ideas are
outdated, his ideals still have vitality. He thought of public administration as
"a field of business."'' The goal was for government to be "efficient"' 5 2 and
to "make its business less unbusinesslike."' 53 A corps of civil servants, a
"semi-corporate body" as he described it, must have thorough training and
technical expertise in delivering services, and the acquisition of such skill
sets was "a plain business necessity."' 5 4 He anticipated the problems of
devolution and warned: "If [power] be divided, dealt out in shares to many,
it is obscured; and if it be obscured, it is made irresponsible .... The less
his power, the more safely obscure and unnoticed does he feel his position
to be, and the more readily does he relapse into remissness."'55 This warning
resonates today. Katrina exposed the incentive for inaction within the
context of group dynamics. Action, such as a mandatory evacuation or
mobilization of vast resources, would require the assumption of individual
responsibility. What would have been the political fallout if an entire city
was forced to evacuate and the storm passed without calamity?156
Wilson's theory of efficient governance is consistent with the general
theory of modem corporate management. Every successful company has a
highly trained workforce, centralized reporting, ability to assess and
mitigate risk, employees acting under proper incentives, and clear lines of
responsibility and accountability. Governance today involves the
147. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887).
148. Id. at 207-08. "Wherever regard for public opinion is a first principle of government,
practical reform must be slow and all reform must be full of comprises." Id. at 208.
149. Id. at 216.
150. KErrL, supra note 127, at 51-54.
151. Wilson, supra note 147, at 209.
152. Id. at 213.
153. Id. at 201.
154. Id. at 216.
155. Id. at 213-14.
156. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 133, at 2 (despite fifty-six hours of advanced
warning state and local officials did not order an evacuation until nineteen hours before
landfall).
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management of disaggregate parts into a cooperative enterprise, not unlike
the workings of the private market. In this sense, the question is one of
organization. In The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase answered the
question: Why do economic actors organize to form a firm? The key, as
Coase identified it, is the cost of procuring cooperation:
The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would
seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The
most obvious cost of "organi[z]ing" production through the price
mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are ....
The costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for
each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must
also be taken into account .... A factor of production (or the
owner thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the
factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as would be
necessary, of course, if this co-operation were a direct result of the
working of the price mechanism. 57
The corporate form is economically justified in part because it reduces
the procurement of cooperation by various economic actors, thus producing
cost efficient transactions. The same cannot be said for the bureaucracies at
work now. In Katrina we saw that the government was structurally ill-suited
for crisis management. In a sudden crisis, the myriad of governmental
bodies and agencies at the various federal, state, and local levels could not
coordinate a proper response.'58 The cooperative costs were high. Moreover,
whereas Wilson envisioned a corps of highly motivated and skilled
technocrats, the reality is that government bureaucracies are not magnets for
the most talented workforce (i.e., merit does not necessarily result in
advancement). 15 9 This applies from political appointees to lines workers. In
an interview, Secretary Michael Chertoff made the stunning admission that
government agencies lack "the skill set" to do "preparedness" functions.160
Perhaps this comment was intended to deflect criticism, an excuse for the
poor performance of his agency, but the admission has a ring of truth. In a
subsequent investigation, Congress found that "all levels of government
157. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390--91 (1937).
158. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 133, at 1 (finding a failure to communicate and
coordinate among various agencies).
159. This is seen in the relative prestige of having a government job. In my native country
of Korea, a bureaucratic government position signifies prestige and power. Unless one has a
political position with a plum title, that is not the case in the United States.
160. Evan Thomas, Michael Chertoff. 'What the Hell's Going On?', NEWSWEEK, Dec. 26,
2005, at 54-55 (quoting Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security).
Additionally, Secretary Chertoff noted that a failure to coordinate and inter-agency bureaucratic
disputes hindered the initial response to Katrina. Id.
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lacked flexibility and adaptability" in responding to the fast changing events
of a major catastrophe. 161 While not surprising, these realities have profound
implications for the future of catastrophe management.
162
The problems of "skill set" and structural capacity are daunting. In my
earlier article, I posited that government programs may encounter a
structural problem when attempting to distribute services:
[T]he government is but a single entity, and a single department
within an agency typically manages any given government
program. These micro-agencies, subject only to bureaucratic
oversight, cannot compete with the private market, which is
subject to the collective forces of supply and demand, innovation
and strategy, and incentives and disincentives. 163
Again, the flood insurance program is a good example. Not only is the flood
program structured poorly from an economic and risk management
perspective, the management of the program has major problems as well.
The NFIP is managed by FEMA, an agency within the Department of
Homeland Security. Within FEMA, only about 40 FEMA employees and
170 contractors constitute a micro-agency that manages the entire flood
insurance program."6 The NFIP has about 4.6 million policyholders in
about 20,000 communities, and it has paid about $14.6 billion in claims as
of August 2005.165 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita would add another $15 to
$25 billion in claims. 166 Obviously, the program is vast and could constitute
the entire business of a publicly traded insurance company. Absent
substantially more resources, the program cannot be effectively managed as
a vertically integrated structure.
Lacking resources, the agency outsources the day-to-day management
responsibilities to the private sector. About ninety-five percent of in force
policies are written by private insurance agents representing ninety-five
161. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 133, at 1.
162. In the case of terrorism risk, even several years after 9/11, the state of preparedness
has been abysmal. See generally 9/11 PUB. DISCOURSE PROJECT, FINAL REPORT ON 9/11
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS (2005). This report provides a "report card" on government's
work in various areas of emergency and terrorism readiness. See id. The 9/11 Commission
identified 41 areas of terrorism readiness that were graded from "A" to "F." See id. Evidently,
the government's GPA is 1.78. This would be rather humorous but for the fact that the 9/11
Commission's intent was serious and terrorism is no laughing matter.
163. Rhee, supra note 1, at 492.
164. GAO, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN NFIP, supra note 102, at 15.
165. Id. at 2.
166. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-183T, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY: OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM 2 (2005).
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private insurers that issue policies and adjust claims. 167 These insurers,
called "write-your-own companies," receive about a third of the premium
income and remit the remainder to the government.1 68 Additionally, they
receive about 3.3% of the incurred losses as compensation for claims
adjustment services. 169 The incentives created by this compensation
structure are perverse: private insurers profit more from the program if they
issue more policies and incur more losses. The program has suffered from
repetitive loss properties, which account for only one percent of insured
properties but for twenty-five to thirty percent of claims.170 Repetitive loss is
indicative of adverse selection, and the root cause is grounded in a policy
requiring only high risk properties to obtain insurance.' FEMA is charged
with assuring a minimum level of quality control in the program, but the
oversight of private insurers has been problematic.' 72 The agency's quality
control methods have been found to lack "statistical validity," and so the
agency does not have the information needed "to have reasonable assurance
that program objectives are being achieved."'73 Again, the fundamental
problem is devolution as noted by the GAO: "It is a difficult challenge to
meet, as services are delivered primarily through a decentralized system of
private-sector contractors, their employees, and their subcontractors."'74
The chief competitive advantage of government is vast financial
resources. In the simple task of distributing welfare, the government is well-
suited to perform this function. For example, the cost ratio of administering
the Social Security program is three percent. 75 In the case of 9/11, the
government successfully provided compensation to victims through the
September 1 1th Victims Compensation Fund while at the same time
limiting the costs associated with the prosecution of tort liability. 176 But
167. GAO, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN NFIP, supra note 102, at 13.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. GAO, CHALLENGES FACING THE NFIP, supra note 107, at 6.
171. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4012(b), 4012a(a), 4013(b)(2) (2000).
172. See GAO, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED N NFIP, supra note 102, at 22.
173. Id. at 28. Under the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004, FEMA is mandated to
implement new processes and requirements for selling flood insurance. Pub. L. No. 108-264, §
104, 118 Stat. 712, 722 (2004). But FEMA has not fully implemented the statute. GAO,
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN NFIP, supra note 102, at 32-34.
174. GAO, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN NFIP, supra note 102, at 34.
175. Rhee, supra note 1, at 462 n.130.
176. Id. at 481-82. The Fund has been criticized on various grounds. See George L. Priest,
The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 527, 529 (2003) (criticizing the fund on the basis that "it lacks any internal rationale of
definition or constraint" found in the systems of compensation provided in society). Despite
criticism, the Fund has largely been successful in providing compensation. "In the end, 2879
claims out of 2976 deaths (representing 97%) were filed." Rhee, supra note 1, at 481 n.235
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when it comes to managing complex endeavors like flood risk mitigation or
crisis management, there is a substantial question of whether the
government is structured to meet this challenge or has the necessary skill
sets.
V. WHAT Now?
In an era of mega-catastrophes, governance can significantly amplify
risk. This is the fundamental lesson of Katrina, and one that should never be
forgotten. Mitigation of risk is a moral mandate. The task is to "straighten
the paths of government.""' In the twenty-first century, the Wilsonian
model of centralized service is outdated, the path of governance no longer
vertical, and the "private-public partnership" unavoidable. Government
service is often delivered through a network of providers, which
increasingly involves the participation of quasi-private and private firms.
The concept of a "private-public partnership" is less a self-defining policy
than a blank canvass on which interested parties paint the picture as they see
it. In the case of flood insurance, private insurers write and adjust policies
and the government pays claims. In the case of 9/11, it construed the
concept as the provision of free reinsurance at the expense of taxpayers.178
But if the risk of natural catastrophes and their collateral risk are to be
mitigated, this partnership must be more than the distribution of funds from
the government to the private sector. The private market is more adept at
assessing complex risks than the government, and this fact must be
exploited. Incentives should be properly aligned among individuals, private
firms and government. The following examples are some discussion topics,
which are embryonic in development and intended only to spur further
dialogue.
A. Catastrophe Pool and Taxation
As currently configured, the flood insurance program is really a welfare
distribution scheme cloaked in insurance terms. The source of funding is the
same as ex post disaster relief, namely the taxpayer. Imagine a government
mandated, universal "catastrophe insurance" program wherein the premium,
(citing LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATrACKS 24-25 (2004)).
177. Wilson, supra note 147, at 201.
178. See Rhee, supra note 1, at 487 (stating that "many of the key players in the insurance
market have experienced and benefited from a 'partnership between the private and public
sectors,' a euphemism for a government cost-sharing program").
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say $100,179 is deducted automatically from tax returns and is set uniformly
across the nation irrespective of risk or wealth. Would this scheme be
perceived to be fair? What would a taxpayer with an average $250,000
home in Cleveland think about funding the lifestyle of a taxpayer in Miami
with a modest $250,000 oceanfront condominium?18 ° The perception may
be that this would be unfair. Compounding this problem of fairness is the
fact that the government's ex post response to catastrophes is not uniform in
policy or welfare distribution. To the extent that welfare is distributed
unevenly to disaster prone areas, there is an implicit catastrophe tax that is
not adjusted for income, wealth or risk.
Perhaps a nationally mandated catastrophe insurance is in order, but such
a program would require a separate agency to manage it just as the flood
insurance program is managed (badly) by FEMA-all in all, not an optimal
solution. If catastrophes are funded by general revenue, however, the tax
infrastructure could be used to collect a catastrophe pool. This "catastrophe
tax" could be structured progressively, allowing for the risks associated
with the geographic region and perhaps property value at risk. Such a
scheme would not be insurance in the sense that the tax is based on
individual actuarial risk. Instead, it would be a pooling arrangement. The
risk could be broadly categorized, maybe on a state by state basis, having a
rational relationship to catastrophic risk and yet not requiring a bureaucratic
infrastructure to support individualized actuarial underwriting. Such a
scheme is a tradeoff, but could be a more fair system than the current one,
which continues to fund catastrophic risks indifferently.
B. Reduction of Coordination Costs
Before Katrina, it was commonly believed that FEMA was the agency
that could coordinate emergency response. 18 That idea is no longer valid. I
question whether the solution simply lies in "fixing" the personnel
problems, or restructuring the agency within the broader government. Just
as the organization of private firms reduces transaction costs, governance
must reduce the cost of coordination. The problem is that more than one
agency is involved in disaster coordination. It is a natural bureaucratic
179. The average flood insurance premium as of June 2005 was $446. GAO,
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN NFIP, supra note 102, at 8.
180. The maximum coverage under NFIP is $250,000 for home and $100,000 for personal
property. 42 U.S.C. § 4013(b)(2)-(3) (2000).
181. A FAILURE OF INITATIVE, supra note 133, at 13 (noting that "FEMA is not a first
responder with the resources to assume principal responsibility for overwhelmed state and local
government during a disaster").
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instinct to acquire as much power as possible, and in the ensuing
competition that power is diffused throughout the various levels and
branches of government. As Wilson noted, divided power results in
irresponsible exercise, the precise situation created in Katrina. 82 The
notable exception is the military, which once called upon, performed
well. 183 The explanation is that the military, like private firms, has deep
experience in planning and executing complex tasks.
Disaster response must be branded so that the responsibility
(accountability) is "unmistakably fixed"'84 on a specific group. Presumably,
this group would include governmental and nongovernmental bodies.
185
Coordination with private firms should be a part of the strategy. Consider
how the logistics and distribution capabilities of firms like Wal-Mart and
FedEx, or the disaster relief experiences of the Red Cross and Oxfam, can
affect the provision of disaster relief. Of course, private for-profit firms are
not in the business of disaster relief. In the case of Katrina, the provision of
goods and services was a matter of charity (and presumably smart
marketing of corporate image). It is a challenge to incorporate private firm
expertise in a traditional government service. But this has been the trend in
government services. We see this phenomenon in such disparate functions
as the provision of flood insurance and the invasion and occupation of Iraq
in which private security firms have played prominent roles. 186 As yet, for-
profit firms have not assumed a substantial role in crisis management, but
business models can be adapted with the right incentives, which may
include government contracts as well as the marketing advantage of having
corporate identities fixed in part to the noble cause of disaster relief. The
broad approach should be to find the right combination of players who
bring the "skill set" and to marginalize the roles of others if the cost of
coordination outweighs any potential benefit.
C. Elimination of Subsidies for Bad Risks
This means that flood insurance, as currently structured, should be
phased out. It is subject to abuse by private insurers and policyholders, and
a national program as complex as flood insurance and risk mitigation cannot
182. Wilson, supra note 147, at 213.
183. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE, supra note 133, at 14 ("The mobilization was massive and,
at least once the call went out, swift and effective.").
184. Wilson, supra note 147, at 213.
185. See Stephanie Strom, After Storm, Relief Groups Consider More Work in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at A14.
186. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 131, at 230-42.
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be effectively managed by a micro-agency of 210 employees. Repetitive
loss experience proves that flood insurance incentivizes risk-taking. Rather
than spending billions to underwrite bad risk and fight nature, the
government could assist people in relocation. As discussed, flood insurance
affects the poor the most, as wealthier people tend to have options on
habitation decisions. The poor lack choices, and it is a suspect assumption
that this class enjoys being flooded from time to time so long as
compensation is available.
There is a social cost to not subsidizing bad risk, in that certain
susceptible communities will shrink in population or ultimately die. But the
price may be worth it in the long-term as less value is placed in harm's way.
This applies to both small communities, which are more portable and
perhaps expendable, and larger cities, which obviously present more
complex problems. With respect to the costs involved in the post-Katrina
solution, the question is whether New Orleans should be rebuilt to its old
self, and if so, whether the new system of levees should be built to the old
standards as well. In any given year, New Orleans could experience a
similar hurricane or worse. The risk is the same (or worse if global warming
continues). It seems that the rational choice is bipolar--either rebuild with a
far stronger defense system, or allow a natural demise of the city. Both
choices have moral as well as economic facets. The fear is that economics
and morality would be compromised. The political price of the sensible
choice-telling citizens that the cost for maximum protection is prohibitive,
or telling them that the government will no longer subsidize the assumption
of high catastrophic risks-may be too high. A compromise may be struck,
returning New Orleans to its pre-Katrina state, a decidedly unsafe condition.
Thus, government action may sow the seeds of another future disaster.
VI. CONCLUSION
This essay does not purport to address the full panoply of problems or
solutions to natural catastrophic risk. Rather, the goal of this essay is
modest-to show briefly another perspective of the causality and
consequence of natural catastrophes and to raise some possible topics for
future discussions of catastrophic risk and governance. Risks are perceived
through human filters, and defined by our values and sensitivity to losses.
The myriad of human activities and choices cross paths with catastrophes to
create greater misfortunes. To the extent that government influences societal
activities and individual choices, which is to say it is a principal actor, it has
a fundamental role in risk management. Proper risk management is more
than an economic issue; it is a moral imperative. The failure to manage risk
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was evident in the response to Katrina. That government failed is
undisputed, but theories of how and why and the proposed fixes will surely
diverge as history unfolds. This article discusses the role of governance in
the management of catastrophic risks. Superficially, Katrina was a failure of
execution, which implies an accident, a one time event in which the natural
event was so large that it overwhelmed the government. On a deeper level,
the catastrophe is rooted in the structural limitations of government in this
modern era, which implies incapability. If so, the implication is that we can
expect more failures of effective governance in catastrophe onset crises.
Katrina was not the first catastrophe in which government failed to either
perceive or manage risk. Nor, I fear, will it be the last.

